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Abstract Multiparty government has often been associated with poor economic policy-
making, with distortions like lower growth rates and high budget deficits. One proposed
reason for such distortions is that coalition governments face more severe ‘common pool
problems’ since parties use their control over specific ministries to advance their specific
spending priorities rather than practice budgetary discipline. We suggest that this view of
multiparty government is incomplete and that we need to take into account that coalitions
may have established certain control mechanisms to deal with such problems. One such
mechanism is the drafting of a coalition agreement. Our results, when focusing on the
spending behavior of cabinets formed in 17 Western European countries (1970–1998),
support our claim that coalition agreements matter for the performance of multiparty
cabinets in economic policy-making. More specifically, we find clear support for an
original conditional hypothesis suggesting that coalition agreements significantly reduce
the negative effect of government fragmentation on government spending in those insti-
tutional contexts where prime ministerial power is low.
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1 Introduction
Beginning with the modern ‘‘classics’’ (Bryce 1921; Lowell 1896), political science has
distinguished between ‘‘strong’’ and ‘‘weak’’ governments; coalition cabinets are assumed
to belong to the latter category. While initially the claim was that only the former provided
for political stability and effective government, more recently the argument ties ‘‘weak
governments’’ to lesser economic efficiency (slower growth rates, larger budget deficits,
higher public debt, and so on). One proposed reason for such distortions is that coalition
governments face more severe ‘‘common pool problems’’, since parties use their control
over specific ministries to advance their specific spending priorities rather than practice
budgetary discipline (e.g., Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999).
Weargue thatweneed to take a closer look at the operation of coalition governments inorder
to understand the relationship between types of governments and economic policy-making.We
address the question of how coalition governments handle economic policy-making by
focusing on government spending as our dependent variable, following the work of several
previous authors; most recently, Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) andMartin andVanberg (2013).
We draw on the recent literature on coalition governance mechanisms (see, e.g., Mu¨ller
and Strøm 2008), which suggests that certain control mechanisms, such as the drafting of
comprehensive policy agreements or ‘‘contracts’’, determine the ability of coalition gov-
ernments to limit the policy discretion of individual parties in their ministerial jurisdic-
tions. This type of argument is also very much in line with the work by ‘‘fiscal
institutionalists’’ who suggest that negotiated spending targets for each ministry can lead to
smaller deficits (see, e.g., von Hagen and Harden 1995). We therefore hypothesize that the
structural weaknesses of multiparty government can (partly) be offset by mechanisms of
coalition governance. More specifically, we focus on the role of ‘‘coalition agreements’’,
and we evaluate a hypothesis saying that, in the presence of a comprehensive coalition
agreement, the impact of government fragmentation on public spending is mitigated. In
addition, we elaborate on a new conditional hypothesis, suggesting that coalition agree-
ments mitigate common pool problems in multiparty cabinets only in certain institutional
settings, more specifically, when prime ministerial (PM) power is weak, or, differently put,
when power is symmetrically distributed in the cabinet.
Our results, when focusing on the spending behavior of cabinets formed in 17 Western
European countries (1970–1998) support our claim that coalition agreements matter for the
performance of multiparty cabinets in economic policy-making. More specifically, we find
clear support for the hypothesis that coalition agreements significantly reduce the effect of
government fragmentation on government spending in those contexts where PM power is
low. Hence, in institutional settings without power asymmetries in the cabinet, coalition
agreements should help to resolve potential common pool problems resulting from mul-
tiple parties having different spending priorities.
2 Theory and hypotheses
2.1 The previous literature on types of governments and economic policy-
making
Traditionally, analyses of economic policy-making have focused on economic explanatory
variables. In recent years, more consideration has been given to how political variables
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affect various policy outcomes, including fiscal policy (e.g., size of government, budget
deficits) and corruption. These political variables include the number and divergence of
veto players (Tsebelis 2002; Hallerberg and Basinger 1998) and fundamental political
institutions such as electoral systems, and their indirect effects in coalition governments
(see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2003, 2006; Persson et al. 2003, 2007; Tavits 2007) .
Several scholars have also argued that the type of government should influence the size
of the public sector, and the main prediction is that coalition governments, or a larger
number of parties in cabinet (government fragmentation), should increase public spending.
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006, p. 251) argue that ‘‘coalitions of many parties will strike less
efficient bargains’’, owing to the fact that a number of electoral interests are represented in
such cabinets, which should lead to a larger public sector. Persson and Tabellini (2006,
p. 732) argue similarly that, when the government relies on a single-party majority, the
competition between incumbent and opposition ‘‘pushes the incumbent towards efficient
policies’’, whereas coalitions are more likely to create electoral conflict, which induces
excessive government spending. Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) show that a larger number
of governing parties is indeed related to more government spending. The subsequent
literature has consistently supported the claim that public spending is higher under
coalition governments than under single-party cabinets and increases with the number of
parties (e.g., Blais et al. 2010; Martin and Vanberg 2013; Persson et al. 2007; Volkering
and de Haan 2001).1
Why then are coalitions prone to produce less satisfactory budgetary policies than
single-party cabinets? Several scholars argue that coalition governments face more severe
‘‘common pool problems’’.2 For example, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999, p. 212) argue
that ‘‘each minister determines the spending priorities of her department, but she does not
consider the full marginal tax burden’’, which is more problematic in coalitions since the
Finance Minister is less likely to be able to control ministers from other parties. Hence,
coalition governments, or cabinets with more members, should be more prone to budget
deficits because of such common pool problems.3
The important result that coalitions spend more and incur larger budget deficits, an
effect that increases with the number of parties, leads to the research question we pursue in
this paper: even if coalitions in the aggregate are inferior in terms of budget restraint, can
1 Fundamentally, the previous literature has been limited when it comes to empirically studying the role of
government institutions when trying to explain economic outcomes. Most empirical studies focus on the
effect of electoral systems (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2003) instead of governmental characteristics.
The studies that do focus on the role of government features have been based on rather crude variable
specifications, for example, focusing only on the number of parties in cabinet (Hallerberg and von Hagen
1999; Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006), a simple dummy specifying if the government was a coalition (Persson
et al. 2007), or measuring minority status (Edin and Ohlsson 1991; Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999). Some
studies have also measured government ‘‘strength’’ by combining several features into an index (Roubini
and Sachs 1989; Borrelli and Royed 1995).
2 Another proposed mechanism draws on Tsebelis’s veto player theory and in the government context
relates to the number and divergence of the cabinet parties. Simplifying the argument, single-party gov-
ernments have only one veto player, while coalition governments have as many as there are cabinet parties
(Tsebelis 2002). Given governments’ constant need to adapt existing policies to new challenges, coalitions
should produce inferior budgetary policies and the outcome should worsen with the number of parties that
need to be accommodated. In this article, we focus on ‘‘common pool problems’’ and how they can be
solved within coalition governments.
3 In this paper, we focus on the literature that refers to government fragmentation in terms of the number of
parties included in the government. There is, however, also a smaller literature that focuses instead on the
effect of the number of cabinet ministers on budget deficits and expenditures (see, e.g., Wehner 2010, 2011
for an overview of this literature and an evaluation of this hypothesis).
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coalition builders avoid or significantly contain the financial problems resulting from the
common pool problems highlighted above?
We are not the first ones to address this research question. Some scholars have argued
that the problem of excessive public spending can be mitigated by various political–
institutional features. The so-called ‘‘fiscal institutionalist’’ literature has identified some
institutional rules that are expected to curb government spending. One such institutional
remedy follows a ‘‘delegation approach’’ and suggests that the common pool problem may
be reduced by delegating veto rights to certain offices, such as the Minister of Finance, not
bound by the particular interests of any spending department, as they will give more weight
to the collective interest of the government, such as keeping a balanced budget (e.g., von
Hagen and Harden 1995). However, the delegation approach is often seen as most feasible
for single-party cabinets since in coalitions no single office holder enjoys the trust of all
government parties. Partisan Ministers of Finance thus would be suspected to benefit
ministers from their own party or ideology and, hence, coalitions would not delegate this
power or find political means to circumvent existing formal rules stating such rights.4
Instead, coalitions are more likely to adopt a so-called ‘‘contract approach’’, particularly
those cabinets characterized by large ideological distances and vigorous competition
between the cabinet parties (Hallerberg et al. 2007, 2009; de Haan et al. 2013). This
approach suggests that coalitions aim at negotiating overall spending targets and rules at
the beginning of the term and each minister works under preset spending limits.
Another way to contain government spending identified by fiscal institutionalists is to
rely on fiscal rules that subject budget decisions to specific constraints (von Hagen and
Harden 1995; Hallerberg et al. 2007, 2009). Martin and Vanberg (2013) have studied how
the existence of these fiscal rules—amendment limits, restrictions on budget size, and
offsetting amendments—affect the coalition parties’ abilities to increase the spending of
‘‘their’’ ministries and to prevent their partners from increasing the expenditure of the
departments under their control. They find such rules to be effective instruments that
significantly mitigate or even eliminate the pressure on government spending resulting
from the presence of multiple parties in government.
Fiscal rules typically are engrained in public laws and often inherited by incoming
coalitions. Still, their working in practice depends on how the rules are interpreted and how
strictly they are observed. This is particularly important in financial planning as both
income and expenditure forecasts critically depend on the quality of the assumptions that
go into their estimation. Overly optimistic assumptions and laxness and delays in moni-
toring the implementation of budgets can cause significant deviations from spending plans
and drive budget deficits. In short, fiscal institutions may fail if political cooperation is
lacking.
We suggest that contributions can be made by drawing on the literature on delegation in
coalitions, where the importance of other government features than the ones described
above have been stressed. This literature is briefly introduced below.
4 A limited role of the Minister of Finance in coalition governments is supported by Goodhart (2013). She
researches the extent to which the partisan affiliation of the Minister of Finance shapes the economic policy
priorities of coalition governments. Focusing on partisan changes in the positions of Minister of Finance and
PM, she finds the latter (who usually comes from the strongest cabinet party) and the real economy more
important.
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2.2 Delegation problems in multiparty governments
The structural weakness of coalition governments is the dividing line between the cabinet
parties. Ministers adhere to individual parties and their interests rather than to the col-
lective goals of the coalition (Martin and Vanberg 2011; Mu¨ller and Meyer 2010a, b).
While party interests may counterbalance individual incentives in single-party govern-
ments, they strengthen individual departmental rationales in coalitions. The government
parties have their own identities, electorates, and policy concerns and they have to go
through elections in their own right, competing also with their coalition partner(s). In
elections, these parties may fight for their survival, continued government participation, or
shares of office spoils and their party record in government may be more important for
their electoral fate than the government record in general. This is the mechanism that is
behind common pool problems in the budgetary policies of coalition governments.
The common pool problem rests in the so-called ‘‘portfolio allocation model’’ presented
by Laver and Shepsle (1996). The portfolio allocation model is based on the assumption
that each policy dimension is governed by a particular portfolio, and that the minister of a
department has considerable discretion in acting on his or her own within the jurisdiction
of the portfolio. Hence, each ministerial portfolio is allocated to one of the coalition
parties, and there is ‘‘no mechanism by which any other party can prevent the portfolio
holder from implementing its ideal point within that jurisdiction’’ (Strøm et al. 2010,
p. 523). This type of coalition governance has been called ‘‘ministerial government’’
(Strøm 1998), or ‘‘fiefdom government’’ in the fiscal institutionalist literature (Hallerberg
2004), which stresses the autonomy of ministers.
However, such a ‘‘ministerial government’’ model does not provide a completely
realistic description of how coalition governments function in parliamentary democracies.
In the real world of coalition politics, governments do not cede complete autonomy to
individual cabinet ministers or department heads.5 Instead, coalition governments may
impose various rules to control individual ministers and to overcome problems of decision-
making and delegation in multiparty governments, and we suggest that this may have
important consequences for our predictions about how coalitions function in terms of
economic policy-making. At the same time, holding a particular portfolio gives the
respective party strong (though not exclusive) influence over the policy-making in the
respective domains and the other parties’ abilities to veto decisions are constrained con-
siderably. We thus draw on the growing literature on coalition governance mechanisms
(e.g., Strøm et al. 2010) .
2.3 Coalition governance and hypotheses about public spending
We argue that the relationship between government fragmentation and policy-making is
more complex than the previous literature has suggested—increasing the number of
governing parties does not necessarily produce distortions. In this section, we present
hypotheses about the role of coalition governance mechanisms, in economic policy-
making, based on the idea that some of the structural weaknesses of multiparty government
can (partly) be compensated by mechanisms of coalition governance. Hence, the effect of
the number of parties in cabinet (government fragmentation) on spending and economic
reform behavior should be conditional on some political–institutional features.
5 See, e.g., Mu¨ller and Strøm (2000, p. 18). This assumption received very modest endorsement when
country-specialists were asked about this feature (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Warwick 1999, p. 371).
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As mentioned above, however, most work within the field has focused on fiscal insti-
tutions. This literature has suggested two main strategies for fighting the common pool
problem: fixed numerical budget targets and restrictive procedural rules. Numerical targets,
such as a balanced-budget law, are ‘‘neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure fiscal dis-
cipline’’ (Alesina and Perotti 1999, p. 16). The literature on procedural restrictions has
identified some institutional rules that are expected to curb government spending. As
discussed above, the simplest procedural remedy to the common pool problem—giving
veto rights to offices not bound by the particular interests of any spending department—is
unlikely to work in coalition cabinets. Rather, fiscal institutionalists suggest that coalitions,
particularly those characterized by large ideological distances and a strong competition
between the cabinet parties, would adopt a contract approach (Hallerberg et al. 2007, 2009;
de Haan et al. 2013).6 Accordingly, such coalitions would aim at negotiating overall
spending targets and rules at the beginning of the term so that each minister would work
thereafter under preset spending limits.
These arguments made in the literature on fiscal institutions can straightforwardly be
connected to an argument about the role of coalition agreements. Such agreements may, for
example, contain explicit spending limits (Hallerberg 2004), but also other policy com-
mitments of which the costs may be uncertain. It is not always clear what the actors
consider more important: sticking to the budget targets or, alternatively, to policy com-
mitments for which increased spending is desirable electorally. More generally, ex ante
mechanisms cannot account for all contingencies that may arise during the term of a
cabinet and which may push in the direction of additional expenditure, reductions in
government revenue, or both. However, we still hypothesize that comprehensive coalition
agreements reduce the (‘‘negative’’) effect of government fragmentation on spending:
H1 In the presence of a comprehensive coalition agreement, the impact of government
fragmentation on government spending is reduced.
It should here be clarified that we do not expect just any kind of coalition agreement to
function as a constraint on parties or ministers in a multiparty cabinet—the agreement has
to be precise and broad enough (covering a broad range of issues), or ‘‘comprehensive’’, in
order for the agreement to have an offsetting effect on government fragmentation. Such
agreements can largely confine governments to agreed projects and fix their budgets.
Ideally, such forecasts are based on detailed planning and budgeting. Comprehensive
agreements may also contain specifics about the extraction of additional resources for the
government. In the presence of constitutional fiscal rules on government spending, such
agreements between the coalition parties can help in achieving the preset targets. In the
absence of such obligations, the agreement may function as partial substitute for fiscal
discipline by preventing spending projects not explicitly agreed on and containing the costs
of those that are included. Quite simply, the more detailed the policy agreements, the
smaller the probability should be that ministers pursue polices not acceptable to the
coalition partners (Mu¨ller and Meyer 2010a, b).7 By committing to such programs,
6 De Haan et al. (2013) show that ‘‘budgetary institutions, no matter whether they are based on a strong
minister of finance or fiscal contracts, become significant in case of strong ideological fragmentation,
thereby mitigating the impact of political fragmentation’’. No such mitigating effect is found for the number
of governing parties.
7 In this paper, we do not address the question why some coalitions have comprehensive agreements and
others only minimal or no agreements (see Mu¨ller and Strøm 2008). While the institutional setting is likely
to influence that choice, it is by far not the only factor that is likely to matter. For instance, a government
formation may occur under time pressure, simply leaving few opportunities for working out an elaborated
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coalition parties take considerable risks as they set themselves up as targets in the case of
unfulfilled promises. Considering the effort required and the associated risks, compre-
hensive coalition agreements are likely when at least one of the coalition partners does not
want to rely on spontaneous coordination in the process of governing, preferring ‘‘con-
tractual’’ obligations that all parties must observe (Mu¨ller and Strøm 2008). For other
parties, consenting to such agreements may be more related to attaining office per se rather
than fixing the government policy agenda ex ante.
Coalition agreements, hence, may (partly) solve the ‘‘common pool problem’’, and here
we can easily connect the ‘‘fiscal institutionalist’’ literature to the literature on coalition
governance mechanisms since they are based on a similar argument: the PM and the
cabinet have delegated powers (e.g., over spending) to individual ministers as department
heads and may run into difficulties in controlling the behavior of these ministers. The main
argument is that the coalition agreement constitutes an ex ante control mechanism which
should, when specified in precise terms, put limits on ministers in terms of spending since
the ‘‘contract’’ establishes what the ministers should do. For example, in the Netherlands,
some agreements have been seen as ‘‘holy’’, considerably diminishing the agenda-setting
power of ministers (Timmermans and Andeweg 2000).
Coalition agreements, especially if public, employ several mechanisms that can reduce
the moral hazard problem that is underlying coalition policy-making. Although not every
policy detail can be fixed ex ante, they establish ‘‘reference points’’ about future policies, in
particular with regard to those issues that are contested between the partners (Hart and
Moore 2008). This is important, as unclearly stated policies tend to produce different
expectations among the coalition partners about the course of the government. If such
expectations are then not met, the short-changed party is likely to retaliate. As indicated,
making the coalition agreements public introduces reputational concerns. In short, pub-
licity of the deal makes it costlier for parties to renege on their concessions and, hence,
more likely to implement what is in the contract. Finally, public coalition agreements
potentially can also help coalition parties to resolve internal problems resulting from
underdetermined expectations. They inform intra-party actors about the conditions of
government participation and commit the party in its entirety, in particular if processed
through more inclusive intra-party decision-making mechanisms.
Typically, coalition builders also are concerned to support their agreements with
mechanisms of oversight and conflict management (Andeweg and Timmermans 2008;
Mu¨ller and Meyer 2010b). Within the government institutions, these mechanisms include
‘‘watchdog’’ junior ministers who can ‘‘keep tabs’’ on the senior minister (see, e.g., Thies
2001; Mu¨ller and Strøm 2000; Verzichelli 2008; Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011) and the use
of parliamentary committees and questions placing ‘‘checks’’ on ministers (Martin and
Vanberg 2011). Specific coalition institutions may also exist to evaluate policy proposals,
table concerns, forge agreements and resolve conflicts (Mu¨ller and Strøm 2000; Andeweg
and Timmermans 2008). Such mechanisms can complement each other and which one is
chosen typically depends on the specific circumstances.
Footnote 7 continued
contract. In addition, the time remaining before the next election may be too short to make it worth investing
in a comprehensive agreement. Other factors relate to the actors involved in the coalition deal. Large
preference divergences between the coalition parties may foster comprehensive agreements. Finally, intra-
party factors may come into play. Parties with inclusive methods for deciding over government participation
may require a document that demonstrates the achievements of the negotiators, while parties with a more
autonomous leadership may be able to do without (Marsh and Mitchell 1999).
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While we thus expect comprehensive coalition agreements potentially to be important
for government policy, they are no panacea (Moury 2011; Timmermans 2006). Even when
supported by the conditions detailed above, they remain incomplete contracts (Williamson
1979; Salanie´ 2005). Parties that write coalition contracts are aware that their foresight
about how the economy and other factors will develop is less than perfect (Hayek 1945)
and that not all contingencies can be addressed in the agreement. Still, they consider that
having an agreement on the most likely scenario to be better than no agreement. They also
know that coalition contracts are not self-enforcing nor can they be enforced by legal
means. Rather, they need to be enforced by political means. While the presence of the
conditions specified above make such political enforcement more likely, we can also
identify conditions that make it less likely. We begin our discussion with the ideological
spending priorities of government parties. Clearly, some parties will value government
budgetary restraint less than others as a goal in its own right. All line ministers also have
strong incentives for portfolio-specific spending regardless of their ideologies.8 Portfolio
allocation according to party policy saliency, a typical feature of coalition governments
(see, e.g., Ba¨ck et al. 2011), strengthens this tendency further.
Finally, we have to consider the institutional setting in which coalition parties interact.
Institutions, such as cabinet members’ constitutional rights and government procedural
rules, can create considerable power asymmetries between the cabinet parties. The classic
source of such power asymmetries within the cabinet, of course, rests in the office of the
Prime Minister, who not only appoints and dismisses cabinet members but may also have
considerable agenda control and steering rights as well as substantial informational
advantages (e.g., Bergman et al. 2003, pp. 179–194). Note that such an institutional setup
in effect resembles the means of delegating budgetary veto power to one central actor,
which fiscal institutionalists have discarded because coalition partners would not be willing
to accept it. Incoming governments typically inherit such institutional rules.
Comprehensive coalition agreements are incomplete contracts that cannot be enforced
through legal channels. We suggest that institutional power asymmetries potentially
undermine the credibility of contractual commitments made by coalition parties, and thus
the effects of a comprehensive coalition agreement may be conditional, with their effects
constraining the effect of fragmentation on spending limited to situations in which the
institutional powers of parties in cabinet are more symmetrically distributed. We therefore
propose a second hypothesis:
H2 In institutional settings where power is symmetrically distributed among the parties
in a coalition, i.e., when there is a weak PM, a comprehensive coalition agreement will
reduce the effect of government fragmentation on spending.
The logic here is that, if one cabinet party has a major advantage in terms of policy
verification and enforcement, the other parties may suspect that it will use those powers in
a partisan manner to advance its goals. We need not think of such behavior as blunt
violations of the coalition contractual commitments. Given the nature of coalition agree-
ments as incomplete contracts and ‘‘reference points’’, it may be more reasonable to think
of violations of the coalition agreements’ spirit by one-sided interpretations of their words
8 Our reasoning is compatible with the argument developed by Falco´-Gimeno (2014) that coalitions
characterized by ‘‘preference tangentiality’’—assigning different saliencies to different policies and port-
folios—are less likely to adopt coalition governance mechanisms such as comprehensive coalition agree-
ments and ‘‘watchdog’’ junior ministers. While preference tangentiality should weaken the ideological
incentives to invest in such mechanisms, it should at the same time strengthen the dangers that arise from
portfolio-related budgetary claims and thus render such investments worthwhile.
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that systematically benefit one party over its partners. While the privileged party’s policy
gains from each decision may not be large, their accumulated effects can be of consid-
erable magnitude.
Under such conditions, the weaker government parties have little or no incentive to
fulfil their part of the deal in terms of budgetary discipline. Even fiscally conservative
parties will not want to let their portfolios and clienteles carry the entire burden of bud-
getary restraint, and spend-thrift parties will have another incentive to demand government
spending. In coalitions with asymmetric institutional powers, the weaker coalition parties
are thus likely to constitute a push-factor for government spending regardless of their
ideological fiscal priorities.
In fact, not only may a comprehensive agreement be ineffective at reigning in the effect
of government fragmentation on spending but it may in fact exacerbate the problem. A
comprehensive coalition agreement ties coalition partners together more closely in the eyes
of voters. Bringing home policy rewards may be the only way to maintain a party’s profile
in a government headed by a PM from another party. This may play out in fighting a
running battle over each government decision with budgetary implications, up to and
including threats of leaving the coalition. This push-factor may be met by a pull-factor as
the PM has the strongest personal incentive to keep the coalition together. Having achieved
what is the apex of a political career, remaining in that office should take an important if
not exclusive role in his or her incentive structure. Appeasing coalition partners and
smoothening the running of government work may well be worth additional spending.
Take the four Danish cabinets headed by Prime Minister Paul Nyrup Rasmussen in the
1990s and early 2000s which all had comprehensive coalition agreements. Note also that the
Danish Prime Minister enjoys considerable powers. The first of these cabinets resulted from
the fall of the last cabinet under Conservative Prime Minister Poul Schlu¨ter who was forced
out of office over the Tamil affair by two of the smaller non-socialist cabinet parties, which
then joined forces with the Social Democrats and left-liberal Radicals. Rasmussen’s center-
left four-party coalition inherited the 1993 budget from its Conservative-led predecessor but
made significant expansions to fight unemployment. However, this already costly Social
Democratic project needed to be bought-off with concessions to the new partners, making the
budget even more expansionary. In the words of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s report
(1993.08, p. 10), ‘‘it took much skill to put together proposals that satisfied the two small
centrist parties in government, the Centre Democrats and the Christian People’s Party, which
have traditionally opposed anything likely to increase the tax burden on business or to fuel
public spending’’. In a similar vein, the leader of the Radical Liberal Party, Marianne Jelved,
praised Rasmussen ‘‘for showing the will and ability to take the smaller parties’ views into
consideration’’. The situationwas similar in the second Rasmussen cabinet that included only
three parties but held a minority position, thus forcing the PM to seek consensus first within
the cabinet and then beyond. Government spending was significantly lower under the two
subsequent two-party minority cabinets of PM Rasmussen of the Social Democrats and
Radicals. Not only did the economy improve considerably and could the government choose
to make the most favourable deal available, either with the right or left opposition (Laver and
Schofield 1990), but the Prime Minister also benefited from a reduced need for internal
coordination and support-buying within the cabinet. This dynamic suggests a striking con-
ditional final hypothesis to test:
H3 In institutional settings where power is asymmetrically distributed among the parties
in a coalition, i.e., when the PM is strong, a comprehensive coalition agreement will
increase the effect of government fragmentation on spending.
Public Choice (2017) 170:33–62 41
123
2.4 How do our hypotheses relate to the fiscal institutionalist literature’s
predictions?
Before turning to evaluating our hypotheses, we should be completely clear about how our
hypotheses relate to the previous literature focusing on similar explanatory features. As
described above, the ‘‘fiscal institutionalist’’ literature has identified two approaches to
curbing government spending: (1) the ‘‘delegation approach’’, which suggests that the
common pool problem may be reduced by delegating veto rights to offices, such as the
Minister of Finance, or the PM, and (2) the ‘‘contract approach’’, which suggests that
coalitions aim at negotiating overall spending targets and rules at the beginning of the term
and that each minister works under preset spending limits. However, most scholars suggest
that the delegation approach is a remedy only for single-party cabinets since in coalitions
no single office holder enjoys the trust of all government parties (Hallerberg et al.
2007, 2009; de Haan et al. 2013).
We agree with these scholars and, since we are here focusing on the common pool
problem arising within coalitions where ministers are appointed from different parties (i.e.,
coalitions) and have different spending priorities, our explanation lies closer to the so-
called ‘‘contract approach’’. Our hypothesis (H1) about the role of comprehensive coalition
agreements relies on mechanisms very similar to the ones proposed by scholars focusing on
the ‘‘contract approach’’, but, rather than concentrating on specific spending limits, our
explanation instead zooms in on the fact that comprehensive agreements ‘‘bind’’ the parties
in more specific ways, and constitute an ex ante control mechanism that should, when
specified in precise terms, put limits on ministers with respect to spending since the
‘‘contract’’ establishes what the ministers should do in terms of policies to be implemented.
Since the ‘‘delegation approach’’ also stresses the role of strong individual actors within the
governments, for example PMs, which we likewise do, we should also make clear how our
argument about the roles of PMs differ from this approach. According to the ‘‘delegation
approach’’, strong PMs may be able to solve common pool problems (e.g., in less ideologically
diverse coalitions),whereaswearguehere that strongPMsshift the ‘‘balanceofpower’’within the
cabinet, creating a situation where power is asymmetrically distributed—hence, we suggest that
strong PMs are in our theory ‘‘detrimental’’ for the functioning of the so-called ‘‘contract
approach’’ in coalition governments. Hence, in a way, and described in a simplified manner, we
are suggesting that a combination of a ‘‘delegation approach’’ and a ‘‘contract approach’’ should
be negative for coalition governments in solving the common pool problem, and may result in
more spending than if just a ‘‘contract approach’’ is used.9
3 Data and methods
3.1 Data sources, country coverage and methodological issues
This section describes all of the variables included in our analyses and identifies our main
data sources. In Appendix Table 2, we also include a more detailed description of all
9 As described by Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999), countries that typically have single-party or ideo-
logically cohesive governments are more likely to have adopted a ‘‘delegation approach’’, and that it may be
difficult to quickly alter this approach (e.g., if the PM’s powers are constitutionally defined). Hence, when an
ideologically diverse coalition forms in such a country, in need of alternative control mechanisms, it may be
that the country ends up with a situation wherein both approaches are used (i.e., that both ‘‘delegation’’ and
‘‘contract’’ mechanisms are used to curb spending).
42 Public Choice (2017) 170:33–62
123
variables and data sources. We combine data from two main sources. First, we use Bawn
and Rosenbluth’s (2006) dataset, generously provided by the authors, which covers 17
Western European countries from 1970 to 1998, and draws on economic data from OECD
sources. It defines a number of political variables drawn from Warwick’s (1999) dataset on
government survival and the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al. 2001).
Second, to measure comprehensive coalition agreements, and some additional political
variables, we draw on the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (Strøm
et al. 2008), which covers all cabinets formed in 17 Western European countries from post-
WWII through 1999. Hence, our country-time coverage is the 17 Western European
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom), covered, in most cases, between 1970 and 1998. This period is one wherein
international influences on domestic budget policies were mostly indirect, mediated by
economic factors and, hence, national governments were relatively free in their choices.
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 set in a process of establishing increasingly tight European
constraints on national budgeting. Analyzing this period allows us to better focus on the
domestic factors that determine the relationship between multiparty government and fiscal
policy. The unit of analysis is the country-year and, following Bawn and Rosenbluth
(2006), for variables that change with cabinets, we have created a weighted average based
on the length of time that each cabinet is in office in each year.
Before turning to describing our variables, we should discuss potential problems with
endogeneity of coalition contracts to unobserved variables. This problem has long been
recognized in the literature on the policy effects of fiscal rules. In that respect, Poterba
(1997, p. 58) refers to Riker (1980), who ‘‘argues that essentially all political institutions
reflect the ‘congealed preferences’ of the electorate. In this view, institutions that no longer
suit a majority of the electorate will be overturned, and the institutional structure of a
nation or state contains no information other than some aggregation of information on
current voter preferences.’’ Poterba (1997, p. 59) goes on to suggest that counterarguments
to such a view of endogeneity problems emphasize the difficulty in changing institutions,
and the costs of amending fiscal rules. He describes two approaches to try to solve the
problem of endogenous fiscal institutions: (1) one strategy is to control for some measure
of (voter) preferences, for example, by including controls measuring party positions, and
(2) another strategy is to use variables that affect budget rules but not fiscal policy as
instrumental variables. However, Poterba (1997) suggests that the latter approach typically
is problematic to implement owing to the difficulty of finding valid instruments.
As we are here focusing on the ‘‘comprehensiveness’’ of coalition agreements rather
than whether or not they include fiscal rules, we believe that the risk is small that some
underlying preferences explain both whether a comprehensive agreement is implemented
by a government and the economic policy-making of that government. However, in our
multivariate models, we do include a ‘‘preference’’ measure, specifying the left–right
ideology of the government, which should, at least in some sense, account for the pref-
erences of the electorate (see below). Concluding a chapter explaining the presence of
formal coalition agreements, Mu¨ller and Strøm (2008, p. 196) suggest that ‘‘once a certain
set of [coalition] governance institutions have evolved in a particular country, these
institutions tend to get replicated in subsequent coalitions’’. This view points to the con-
clusion that coalition contracts are relatively stable institutional features. Demanding
changes in coalition negotiations to such time-honored rules might raise suspicion among
the coalition partners. As a consequence, such rules are difficult and costly to change,
suggesting that endogeneity issues should not be an important problem here.
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3.2 Operationalization of government spending and explanatory variables
Our dependent variable is total government spending. Measuring government spending is
relatively straightforward, and we here follow Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) in including a
government spending variable, which measures the ‘‘overall government expenditure in a
given year, measured as a fraction of GDP’’ (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006, p. 256).10
One of our main explanatory variables is the number of parties in government. This
variable is taken from the Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) dataset, which draws on infor-
mation from Warwick (1999) and is a straightforward count of the number of parties in
government. To solve the problem that governments may change during a year (as the
analysis is performed on an annual basis), the variable is weighted by the number of days
in power, resulting in non-discrete values for cases in which the number of parties in
government changes during the year.
In moving beyond Bawn and Rosenbluth, we focus on two factors: coalition agreements
and PM powers. As described by Mu¨ller and Strøm (2008, pp. 174–176), coalition
agreements differ in their completeness: ‘‘some coalitions are based on a comprehensive
policy programme, in which the participants commit themselves to a broad range of policy
initiatives’’, whereas other programs include commitments only on a few selected issues.
To gauge whether there was a comprehensive agreement in each of the cabinets in the 17
Western European countries, we rely on a variable drawn from the Comparative Parlia-
mentary Data Archive, which is based on a content analysis of coalition agreements by
country experts. The agreements were classified according to a four-category ordinal
coding scheme: (1) no policy agreement, (2) agreement on a few selected policies only, (3)
agreement on a variety of issues, and (4) agreement on a comprehensive policy program.
Our main results rely on a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a comprehensive
policy program was in place (which existed in 43 % of the country-years in our sample).
Alternative operationalizations lead to similar results, as shown in the appendix.
Assessing PM powers—and specifically the powers that might weaken the credibility of
coalition agreements—is not a trivial matter. It is important for our purposes to focus on
institutional measures of PM powers, given our theoretical argument and the fact that
reputational measures of PM power are frequently conditional on other contextual factors,
such as whether the PM was leading a single-party or a coalition government (cf. O’Malley
2007). As the institutional powers of the PM change rarely, we are forced to rely on
measures of PM strength that are not time-varying.11
In general, however, various PM powers typically are correlated: institutionally strong
PMs usually have a full range of agenda control in cabinet, appointment and dismissal
powers, administrative capacity, and so forth, whereas weak PMs fail to have most of these
powers (Bergman et al. 2003). Given the correlation across indicators, most markers of
particular PM powers do not simply capture just one specific power, but are also rough
proxies for other powers. The primary measure we rely on is taken from Bergman et al.
(2003): it is a dichotomous indicator as to whether the PM has the (exclusive) ability to
10 Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006, p. 256) measure spending, or the ‘‘size of the public sector’’, as ‘‘Total
Government Spending as a Fraction of GDP’’ (CN056OTT), and we rely on their expenditure data, which
are based on the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts Database. As described by the OECD (https://data.
oecd.org/gga/general-government-spending.htm#indicator-chart), ‘‘General government spending generally
consists of central, state and local governments, and social security funds’’.
11 The resources and staff in many PM offices have been strengthened over time in Western Europe, but the
fundamental institutional powers (which are more central to our theory) rarely have been altered signifi-
cantly (e.g., Poguntke and Webb 2005).
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control the cabinet’s agenda. This power seems central to intra-coalition relationships, and
is also a power that is both highly correlated with most other PM powers. The measure
divides our sample roughly in half, with PMs in Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom coded as having agenda control,
whereas PMs in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands,
Norway and Sweden are coded as not having agenda control. Relying on alternative cross-
sectional measures of PM powers, including dichotomous measures, such as whether the
PM has unilateral ability to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers, explicit authority to
coordinate inter-ministerial concerns, or even the trichotomous coding found in King
(1994), lead to similar results, as reported in the appendix.
Following Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), we include a range of political and economic
control variables, and we here adopt their approach, and include control variables for the
effective number of parties in the legislature, ENP (legislative fragmentation), government
ideology (left–right scores drawn from comparative manifestos data), caretaker govern-
ments, per capita GDP in billions of US dollars, unemployment (unemployed as a per-
centage of the total labor force), the dependency ratio (fraction of population over age 64
and under age 15), and trade openness (imports ? exports, divided by GDP). Finally, we
control for budgetary institutions, using data originally collected by Hallerberg et al.
(2009), also included in the analyses of Martin and Vanberg (2013). Descriptive statistics
for our sample are reported in the appendix (see Appendix Tables 3, 4).
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Graphical presentation of the relationships between spending
and explanatory features
Central to our argument is the idea that different factors may condition the long-established
effect of the number of parties in government on government spending. We begin our
analyses by reporting our data graphically, broken down by the key conditions that we have
identified.12 The first panel of Fig. 1 focuses on the cases in which no comprehensive
policy agreement was in place between coalition partners, showing the relationship
between the number of parties in a coalition government and government spending in cases
of strong PMs (circles) and weak PMs (triangles). While government spending is on
average about one point lower (as a percentage of GDP) in the countries with a weak PM,
the estimated effect of increasing the number of parties on government spending in both
cases is nearly identical, and comparable to previous estimates of the effect of the number
of parties in government on government spending.13
The second panel focuses on the relationship between government spending and the
number of parties when a comprehensive coalition agreement exists, showing results that
are consistent with our second hypothesis. When a coalition agreement is combined with a
weak PM, essentially no relationship exists between the number of parties in government
12 Reporting the raw data graphically allows us to show how our results are driven by the variation within
coalition governments (as suggested by our theory), rather than simply coalition versus single-party gov-
ernments, and that no major non-linearities in the relationship suggest that the linear regression results we
report are mis-specified.
13 The slope here is indicative of additional spending of roughly 0.3 % of GDP for each additional party,
comparable to the main results in both Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) and Martin and Vanberg (2013).
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and government spending. However, a coalition agreement combined with a strong PM is
associated with a marked rise in government spending as the number of parties in gov-
ernment increases—the estimated effect of each additional party in this case is nearly five
times larger than the pooled relationship between government fragmentation and spending
in our sample. Thus, at a descriptive level, there appears to be some support for both of our
conditional hypotheses.
4.2 Multivariate analyses of government spending, coalition agreements
and PM power
Of course, the results shown in Fig. 1 simply highlight our central finding graphically.
Statistical analyses are needed to show that the results are significant and robust to
alternative explanations. Our statistical analyses replicate and extend Bawn and Rosen-
bluth’s (2006) work on the effects of coalition cabinets on government outlays. Models 1
and 4 in Table 1 report the main results of interest from Bawn and Rosenbluth’s study:
Fig. 1 Scatter plots and bivariate relationship between the number of parties and government spending for
different types of systems
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increasing the number of parties in government significantly increases government outlays
in the subsequent year. Model 1 reports an OLS regression model with panel corrected
standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995); the effect is estimated at roughly 0.3 % of GDP.14 In
Model 4, which includes country fixed effects, the estimated coefficient is larger, at
roughly 0.55 % of GDP.15 Complete models reporting all control variables, as well as
additional robustness models testing additional specifications and alternative measures, can
be found in the appendix (Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9).
In Models 2 (random effects) and 5 (fixed effects), we enter the indicator for compre-
hensive coalition agreements and its interaction with the number of cabinet parties to test our
first hypothesis. The results of neither model provide support for Hypothesis 1. In fact, both
models suggest that themarginal effect of each additional party in government on spending is
slightly greater when a comprehensive coalition agreement is in place. While these models
fail to find significant support for our first hypothesis, the lack of support may, however, stem
from the possibility that agreements vary in their effectiveness depending on the institutional
environment. If, as suggested in our discussion of Hypotheses 2 and 3, the effect of coalition
agreements in mitigating the common pool problem is conditional on PM powers, with the
effect going in opposite directions in countries with weak and strong PMs, it should be
unsurprising to find no support for Hypothesis 1. We test this possibility using a three-way
interaction between changes in the number of parties, types of coalition agreements, and PM
powers in Models 3 and 6 in Table 1.
Although the coefficient on the triple interaction term is significant in the predicted
direction in Models 3 and 6 of Table 1, it is difficult to interpret the overall magnitude and
statistical significance without further calculation. Figure 2 demonstrates graphically the
tests of Hypothesis 2 from Table 1, showing the results of the marginal effects of the number
of parties when PM powers are weak. The results for Models 3 and 6 are consistent with
Hypothesis 2: the marginal effect of the number of parties on spending is positive and
significant when no comprehensive coalition agreement is in place, but insignificant in the
presence of such an agreement. However, this difference in themarginal effect of the number
of parties is not statistically significant at conventional levels in most of our models.16
Figure 3 reports comparable graphical interpretations of the marginal effects of the
number of parties in the presence of a strong PM. The support for Hypothesis 3 is strong
and robust in both the random effects and fixed effects models: the marginal effect of the
number of parties on spending for governments with strong PMs and a comprehensive
coalition agreement typically is four times larger than when no comprehensive agreement
14 Unlike Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), but consistent with Martin and Vanberg (2013), who also replicate
and extend the Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) analyses, we include only the lagged number of parties
variable.
15 The main specifications we report are the two most common model specifications for our data: (1) pooled
OLS models with random effects and panel-corrected standard errors, and (2) models with country fixed
effects. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of time trends, year dummies and alternative approaches
to handling autocorrelation and temporal dynamics, as reported in the Appendix.
16 Esarey and Sumner (2015) critically evaluate the now standard practice of comparing overlapping
confidence intervals for testing the effects of interactions. In a situation such as our Hypothesis 2, where we
theorize one marginal effect to be significant in a specified direction and another specific coefficient to be
insignificant, their simulations suggest that confidence intervals based on a t-value of*1.1 more accurately
provides the equivalent of a standard one-tailed 95 % confidence level hypothesis test. However, the
differences between the standard practice of reporting 90 % confidence intervals (t = 1.28) is relatively
minor, and does not affect the interpretation of our results, so we use the more conservative standard
practice, even though doing so may understate slightly the significance of the difference between the two
marginal effects.
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exists. One note of caution is the larger confidence interval associated with the strong PM,
comprehensive agreement combination, which is largely attributable to the fact that that
combination is present in only 51 observations, whereas each of the other combinations in
Fig. 2 Testing Hypothesis 2: marginal effects of the number of governing parties on spending under weak
PMs, conditional on the presence of a comprehensive coalition agreement
Fig. 3 Testing Hypothesis 3: marginal effects of the number of governing parties on spending under strong
PMs, conditional on the presence of a comprehensive coalition agreement
Public Choice (2017) 170:33–62 49
123
our sample has more than 100 observations.17 However, even with the smaller sample size
for this combination, the difference in estimated effect is striking, being both statistically
significant and consistent across all of our models.18
Overall, while we do not find support for our Hypothesis 1, and thus no support for an
overall mitigating effect of comprehensive coalition agreements on the common pool
problem in coalition government’s fiscal policy, our results do find support for conditional
effects of comprehensive coalition agreements on fiscal policy. Consistent with Hypothesis
2, when PMs are weak and in the absence of a comprehensive coalition agreement, we find
a statistically significant effect of the number of parties on government spending, but no
significant effect of the number of parties on spending when such an agreement exists. Our
empirical results find even stronger support for Hypothesis 3, which suggests that the
combination of a strong PM and a comprehensive coalition agreement may perversely
exacerbate the common pool problem seen in cabinet governance. Overall, these results
suggest that mechanisms for managing coalition bargaining may have quite different
effects when one party has disproportionate institutional power .
5 Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions to the study of multiparty government. The emerging
literature on coalition governance has hardly addressed the effects of coalition governance
mechanisms on policy outcomes. In this paper, we aim at making a contribution towards
that research agenda by addressing the role of comprehensive coalition agreements. And
while the literature on coalition governance has shown how existing institutions—such as
parliamentary committees and junior ministers (Martin and Vanberg 2011; Thies 2001)—
can be used for the purpose of coalition governance, the present paper shows that another
institution—a powerful Prime Minister—may pose a severe challenge for interparty
cooperation in cabinet decision-making. The aim of this paper has been to evaluate the role
in economic policy-making of policy contracts written by coalition parties at the time of
government formation. Do comprehensive policy agreements mitigate potential problems
that may occur in multiparty governments? We have here developed a hypothesis that
policy contracts function as solutions to delegation problems in coalitions only in certain
institutional settings, where PM power is weak.
Our results, when focusing on the spending behavior of cabinets formed in 17 Western
European countries (1970–1998), support the general idea that the drafting of coalition
agreements matter for the performance of multiparty cabinets in economic policy-making.
We find support for our newly formulated conditional hypothesis and show that coalition
agreements reduce the negative effect of government fragmentation on spending only in
those contexts where the PM is weak. However, our results suggest the opposite effect of
comprehensive coalition agreements when the PM is strong. While the results suggest that
coalition agreements may help solve the common pool problems in coalition governments
17 Our dataset comprises 102 observations of weak PMs with comprehensive coalition agreements, 114
observations of weak PMs without comprehensive agreements and 139 observations of strong PMs without
comprehensive coalition agreements.
18 We report a number of additional models in the appendix, including models showing that our results are
robust to controlling for budgetary rules (Table 6), as is done in Martin and Vanberg (2013), who also
replicate and extend Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), building on the arguments and measures of Hallerberg
et al. (2009).
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in certain circumstances, their effect in other circumstances may perversely exacerbate
common pool problems.
We suggest that future work should also look at the role of coalition agreements when
predicting actual reform behavior, not just spending levels. This would in turn allow
scholars to address problems of ‘‘veto player deadlock’’ and test hypotheses about the role
of veto players more directly (Tsebelis 2002). However, to analyze the role of coalition
agreements when explaining reform behavior, we need ‘‘better’’ data on actual economic
reform measures. We suggest that it would be ideal to rely on more direct measures of
actual reforms rather than the indirect measures used in many previous studies.
Another potential avenue for future research is to investigate the role of alternative so-
called ‘‘coalition governance mechanisms’’, for example, the appointment of junior min-
isters (see, e.g., Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011; Strøm et al. 2010; Thies 2001). One control
mechanism, labeled ‘‘watchdog junior ministers’’, suggests that parties in a coalition
appoint a junior minister from another party to ‘‘keep tabs’’ on the senior minister. Hence,
agency loss is here expected to be reduced by having a ‘‘watchdog’’ in the department, who
could, for example, inform the PM about irregular spending behavior, thereby solving
potential common pool problems in multiparty cabinets. Another feature worth taking a
look at is a powerful coalition committee that brings together the most important leaders of
all coalition parties as something like ‘‘equals’’. Whatever the committee would decide,
would then be implemented though the intra-party chain of command from the party leader
to ministers or MPs (Andeweg and Timmermans 2008).
Another avenue of research focuses on other government features to qualify the claim that
multiparty governments are less able to deal with economic policy-making and looks instead
at the ability of coalition partners to make credible commitments. Ba¨ck and Lindvall (2015)
suggest that only specific types of multiparty governments are prone to produce more public
debt, namely, those coalitions that are unable to resolve inter-temporal bargaining problems.
Coalitions that are able to solve such problems and are able to commit to fiscal reform are not
likely to perform worse than single-party governments. The authors show that coalition
governments with high ‘‘commitment potential’’ do not accumulatemore debt than do single-
party governments. Future work should consider potential interactions between coalition
governance mechanisms and the degree of commitment potential.
We also believe that future research on the role of coalition agreements in economic
policy-making could gain from a more precise classification of coalition agreements. More
work should be done coding the particular policy issues that are covered in the ‘‘contract’’
and, following the ‘‘fiscal institutionalist’’ literature, more work should be done to code
whether more specific information on fiscal rules or targets are included in the coalition
agreements presented by European governments. This should allow us to understand even
better the role of coalition agreements in solving common pool problems, and how they
might influence decision-making in multiparty governments. In addition, more work
should be done explaining why some coalitions implement more comprehensive agree-
ments whereas others do not. To date, very little work has focused on explaining why
coalitions choose different types of coalition agreements, even though important work has
been done by Mu¨ller and Strøm (2008) explaining the presence of formal coalition
agreements. Predicting coalition agreements, institutional features, situational features
(e.g., time pressure), and preferences of coalition partners (e.g., preference divergence and
policy saliency) are important features to take into account.
The present paper has taken seriously the concerns about governing in multiparty
coalitions that have been present ever since political scientists started addressing issues of
government under proportional electoral laws. More specifically, the article has addressed
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the most recent incarnation of such concerns relating to economic efficiency. While the
underlying problems are real, we argue that they are best seen as a challenge to coalition
architects rather than a fate that inevitably ties coalition economic policy-making to
inferior performance. Our analyses suggest that careful design of coalition governance
mechanisms can contain problems of inter-party cooperation and improve policy output.
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Appendix
See Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.




Total government spending as a fraction of
GDP (%)
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), who draw
on the OECD Quarterly National
Accounts Database





Based a content analysis of coalition
agreements by country experts. The
agreements were coded as such: (1) no
policy agreement, (2) agreement on a few
selected policies only, (3) agreement on a
variety of issues, and (4) agreement on a
comprehensive policy programme
We include a dichotomous indicator: 1 if
there is a comprehensive coalition
agreement (4), and 0 otherwise
Comparative Parliamentary Democracy
Data Archive (Strøm et al. 2008)
PM powers Based on a coding of constitutional texts by
country experts
We include a dichotomous indicator: 1 if the
PM has the (exclusive) ability to control the
cabinet’s agenda, and 0 otherwise
Comparative Parliamentary Democracy
Data Archive (Strøm et al. 2008)
Budget rules Based on surveys with officials
We include the Budgetary Constraints Index
provided by Martin and Vanberg (2013,
pp 958–959), including information on (1)
‘‘Centralized budget formulation’’, (2)
‘‘Amendment limits’’, (3) ‘‘Restrictions on
budget size (general fiscal constraint)’’, (4)
‘‘Restrictions on budget size (parliament
vote on total budget), and (5) ‘‘Off-setting
amendments’’
The index has a theoretical minimum of 0
(most permissive) and a maximum of 1
(most restrictive)
Martin and Vanberg (2013), who draw
on Hallerberg et al. (2009)




ENP The effective number of parties in the




2, where pi is the seat share of party i
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006)
Ideology Based on Comparative Manifestos data,
(content analysis/hand coding of election
manifestos)
The ideological position of a government is
the weighted average of the positions of the
parties in the government coalition (low
values indicate a more left-wing position)
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), who draw
on (Budge et al. 2001)
Caretaker Caretaker governments are formed to
function in a non-partisan or caretaker
capacity
The variable is the fraction of the year for
which there is a caretaker government (%)
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), who draw
on Warwick (1999)
GDP GDP per capita, measured in billions of US
Dollars (using 2000 as a base year), divided
by population in millions
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), who draw
on the OECD Economic Outlook
Database
Unemployment Unemployment is measured as the number of
unemployed as a percentage of the total
labor force (%)
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), who draw
on the OECD Economic Outlook
Database
Dependency The dependency ratio is measured as the
fraction of the population that is either
under 15 or over 64 (%)
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), who draw
on the OECD Economic Outlook
Database
Trade openness Trade openness is measured as
Imports ? Exports, divided by GDP
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), who draw
on the OECD Economic Outlook
Database
Table 3 Descriptive statistics (all variables)
Variable n Min Mean Max SD
Government spending 466 25.9 46.0 67.5 7.7
Parties 469 1.0 2.3 5.3 1.2
Parties (LD) 450 –2.5 0.0 2.7 0.5
Comprehensive coalition agreement (0/1) 469 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.5
Comprehensive coalition agreement (0/112) 469 0.0 0.9 2.0 0.9
PM powers (0/1) 469 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
PM powers (0/112) 469 0.0 1.0 2.0 0.8
ENP 469 1.8 3.7 8.4 1.3
Ideology 469 –45.6 –3.7 61.1 19.6
Caretaker 469 0.00 0.01 0.35 0.04
GDP (pc, ln) 468 8.1 19.0 42.7 5.2
Unemployment 465 0.0 6.5 23.8 4.6
Dependency ratio 469 29.9 34.7 42.3 2.5
Trade openness 469 21.4 246.2 68.4 46.6
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Table 6 OLS regressions with government spending as dependent variable, robustness tests controlling for
budget rules
Model A7 Model A8
Parties (L) 0.53 (0.17)** 0.89 (0.22)**
Comp coalition agreement (L) 1.38 (0.69)** 1.34 (0.76)*
Comp Ag (L) 9 parties (L) –0.54 (0.24)** -0.33 (0.25)
PM powers –0.90 (0.48)* -0.82 (0.84)
PM powers 9 parties (L) 0.18 (0.17) 0.05 (0.33)
PM powers 9 comp Ag (L) –4.05 (1.37)** –4.46 (1.58)**
PM pow 9 comp Ag (L) 9 parties (L) 1.80 (0.49)** 1.64 (0.61)**
Budget rules 1.09 (0.70) 1.96 (1.49)
Budget rules 9 parties (L) –0.79 (0.30)** –1.08 (0.37)**
ENP (L) –0.07 (0.11) –0.18 (0.17)
Ideology (L) –0.01 (0.01)** –0.01 (0.01)**
Caretaker (L) –2.89 (2.55) –2.34 (2.43)
GDP –2.57 (0.29)** –2.57 (0.28)**
GDP (L) 2.60 (0.30)** 2.59 (0.29)**
Unemployment 0.20 (0.10)** 0.28 (0.11)**
Unemployment (L) –0.23 (0.10)** –0.19 (0.10)*
Dependency –0.26 (0.41) –0.38 (0.42)
Dependency (L) 0.36 (0.43) 0.43 (0.44)
Trade openness –0.08 (0.04)** –0.08 (0.04)**
Trade openness (L) 0.09 (0.04)** 0.08 (0.04)*
Outlays (L) 0.89 (0.02)** 0.82 (0.03)**
Constant 2.10 (2.65) 7.08 (4.10)**
Models A7 and A8 replicate Models 3 and 6, respectively, but include budget rules interacted with the
number of parties, as per Martin and Vanberg (2013)
* Significant at the 0.10 level
** Significant at the 0.05 level
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